Most presidents of the United States search for a catchphrase that best encapsulates their vision for the nation: JFK called his “The New Frontier”, LBJ “The Great Society”, FDR “The New Deal”, while Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama elected to employ more pithy slogans like “A Shining City on a Hill, “Change”, “Hope”, and “Yes We Can!”
However much Donald Trump may want to use, “Make America Great Again!” his wild policy gyrations make the moniker, “Swing Like a Weather Vane!” much more appropriate.
Journalists, commentators, and national security specialists within and without the traditional elites seem to agree with this, absent a coherent vision or doctrine from the 45th commander-in-chief: the Trump administration is sending confusing, potentially dangerous, mixed messages in the area of America’s foreign and domestic policy.
But are they missing the big picture, not seeing the proverbial forest for the tweets?
Sometimes the perceived chaos takes the form of Trump supposedly “undermining” his cabinet officers’ statements – such as when he speculates that we may be heading for “a major, major conflict with North Korea” on the very same day Secretary of State Rex Tillerson says the United States is willing to talk with Pyongyang. Days later, the President calls Kim Jong-un “a tough cookie” and states that he would be “honoured” to meet with the despot (perhaps over a burger?).
At other times, the head-scratching is based on Trump’s own words conveying different emphases in occasionally wildly different contexts. On one hand, he says all U.S. options, including the use of force, are on the table against North Korea. But, mindful of his own governing challenges, he also expresses empathy for the young Kim’s being suddenly thrust into power after his father’s death. We haven’t even touched on his assertions about the US Civil War or how Andrew Jackson could have prevented it, had he not had the gall to die fifteen years before the actual conflict broke out.
For Asia foreign policy thinkers, the favorite examples of the mixed message meme are his apparent reversals on the “one China” policy and in labelling China as a currency manipulator.
Yet one does not have to ascribe to Trump either the complex intricacies of a Machiavellian mind or a Kissingerian realpolitk strategic global vision to recognize that (a) much of the criticism is somewhat shallow and self-contradictory on its face, and (b) mitigated by a superb senior national security team, the president’s pragmatic, seemingly erratic style manifests a shrewd transactional approach that actually produces strategic results.
The controversy over Trump’s telephone call with Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen and questioning of the one China policy -- at the time excoriated by experts as perilous departures from mainstream American foreign policy -- got China’s attention in a way the smoothly diplomatic play-by-the-rules the Obama administration’s approach never could, while giving a modest boost to Taiwan’s international recognition.
The rapid-fire episodes (Trump’s Chinese shock and awe?) did not indelibly sour U.S.-China relations, as many feared they might. On the contrary, they set the stage for Trump to entertain the Chinese leader and his wife and present a firm, clear message on North Korea: either Beijing applies its personalized leverage over Pyongyang on the nuclear and missile crisis, or America will use its own special means to solve the problem: the “everything is on the table” argument with its implied threats.
The now-legendary Trump unpredictability has provided him the credibility needed to convince China’s leaders to take him seriously and start cracking down on North Korea. In the back of Xi’s mind, the seed has been planted: there’s no telling what America’s Fifth Avenue cowboy might do next, on either North Korea or Taiwan.
Beijing seems to understand, even if many observers do not, that there is no policy inconsistency between a U.S. willingness to talk with Pyongyang -- as Tillerson says, about denuclearization -- and a warning that the objective will be achieved one way or the other. Trump is comfortable -- even if it makes others less so -- playing his own dual role of good cop/bad cop. One just has to cue up any old ‘Apprentice’ and WWF episode for an illustration of him leveraging this style.
The president and his team have made it abundantly clear to Beijing publicly, and almost certainly in private -- over dessert for Xi and cruise missiles for Syria -- that they hold China accountable for the existential threat North Korea’s nuclear and missile present to South Korea, Japan, and the United States.
And if China doesn’t finally produce on North Korea? As the President said recently in a televised interview, “We’ll find out whether or not President Xi is able to effect change.” Other leaders had invested their hopes and wishes on Beijing’s cooperation, but the consequences of Chinese inaction simply faded into the diplomatic mists.
Trump instead is placing major explicit expectations on Xi’s shoulders -- even noting that Pyongyang’s failed missile test this week showed a lack of "respect" for the Chinese leader. It's as if he saying, "Well, if you want to be seen as a superpower, then act like one and help solve issues, instead of standing by the sidelines trying to offer sage advice." And he has left little doubt that Washington will "solve" the problem if Beijing can’t or won’t, saying,“We cannot allow what has been going on for a long period of time to continue.” That sounds like a degree of policy coherence many would-be critics are reluctant to acknowledge.
All in all, the president has turned the China-U.S. dynamic on its head. Previous administrations have been reluctant to challenge China on human rights, trade, or the South China Sea because Washington “needs” China on North Korea. In fact, since the United States theoretically needs Chinese cooperation on virtually everything, we challenged it on virtually nothing.
Trump has reversed the logic. Even before entering into serious talks, he laid down a series of defiant markers to China: taking an unprecedented call from Taiwan’s president, putting the viability of America’s one China policy in doubt, and threatening to label China a currency manipulator.
Suddenly, it was Washington, not Beijing, that had the negotiating leverage. Only after shaking Beijing into a recognition that the old status quo is no longer acceptable has Trump been willing to soften his approach.
Thus, he first linked “one China” to trade and Xi came running, then he pivoted and linked trade to a commitment on North Korea. Now he seems willing to link another phone call with Taiwan’s Tsai to prior consultation with Xi, at which time he will undoubtedly be checking on how the Chinese mission to North Korea is proceeding.
For all the discomfiture Trump’s unorthodox negotiating style may bring to the foreign policy establishment, it seems to be working. Who knows — after Kim sees what a newly-motivated China and/or a fed-up United States can do to his regime, he may be happy to trade his nukes for a hamburger at Mar-a-Lago.