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A Wild Ride: U.S. Election 2024

Writer's picture: Mark ChinMark Chin


If truth is the usual first casualty in a hard-fought political campaign, then perspective is a close second.

 

Take the much of the global (and especially US) media’s near-collective swoon over Kamala Harris’ recent replacement of Joe Biden as the Democratic party’s standard bearer in the US presidential contest. One could be forgiven for thinking that both her securing of the nomination and selection of Minnesota governor Tim Walz as her running mate have resulted in “game-changing” moments which has given the incumbent party a strategic edge over the GOP.

 

Indeed, there has been a distinctively triumphalist tinge to recent coverage of Harris and Waltz with the “traditional” media practically overflowing with rapturous praise of her crowd sizes, audience enthusiasm, “energy” and “surge” in the polls.

 

All this is well and good. Undeniably the last three weeks have been unprecedented in US political history: there has been the assassination attempt on Donald Trump, the selection of J.D. Vance for the GOP VP slot, and the successful Republican convention quickly followed by Joe Biden’s not entirely unforeseen withdrawal from the Democratic nomination process.

 

But Kamalamania is really about media-driven hype. It is not about objective perspective. And we should not lose ours in all of this manufactured confectionary.

 

There is no doubt that Harris’ nomination is significant from the perspective that the Democrats, once so dispirited by Biden’s shocking debate performance, are now re-energized by a candidate who is young(ish), energetic, media-savvy, capable of counter punching GOP barbs and can string more than two words together coherently. The fact that they have anyone other than Biden would have been cause for celebration. That she was sagacious (and calculating) enough to have picked the Everyman avatar Waltz, was enough to begin to bring back disaffected Democrats.

 

Yet, that last point is important. For all of the puff-pieces and breathlessness from the coverage, Harris has only managed to draw even in the national polls as well as be within the margin of error either way in the battleground states. Thus, for all intents and purposes her ascendancy has returned the presidential race to nothing more than the status quo of America’s divisive political reality. Nothing fundamentally has changed: the US remains still deadlocked, almost evenly divided between the core 43-44% who support either major party, with the critical factor being the remaining undecideds who hold the true balance. What she must do is to gain a significant bounce from the upcoming Democratic party convention of at least 5% or more nationally and maintain that lead for the rest of the campaign to election day in order to have a reasonable chance of winning.

 

What pundits (both armchair and ‘expert’) ignore at their peril, is the Republican party’s inherent advantage in the US’s curious system: the electoral college. The popular vote does not determine the winner, but rather instead it’s who gets 270 electoral votes out of the total 538 (distributed in rough proportion to their population with an artificial ‘basement’ for less populous states). And in this, the GOP starts with a “red wall” of states from the solid South, the West, and the crucial Industrial Midwest state of Ohio. That adds up to a base of 202 electoral votes vs the Democrats, who start with 189. This leaves Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Virginia, Arizona, Florida and North Carolina to play for as “toss-ups.” The Republican advantage is even more stark when put in these terms: in order to win the presidency, a GOP candidate needs to keep the base and win a plurality in enough states like Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania to hit 270 and go over the top. This is exactly what happened in 2016, when Hillary Clinton lost popular vote in those states to Trump while still beating him by almost 3 million votes overall in the entire US. In 2024, once again Trump does not need to win the overall national popular vote but win the popular vote in just those states.

 

How did things end up like this? Over the last two decades, a plausible case can be made that the Democratic Party has become steadily more elitist, appealing to largely urban, college-educated voters clustered on both coasts around such powerhouse hubs like New York City, Boston, DC, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle and Portland. As the party moved in this direction through their positions and platforms, Democrats steadily ceded their FDR-established hold on the blue-collar vote. These voters turned away from the high-tower espoused theories about globalization, “re-skilling” and “up-skilling” which saw jobs being exported to lower-paid workers in other countries, entire industries battered, and communities disrupted. Add to this bloc African Americans, Hispanics and Asians who came to see their votes as taken for granted as many in those communities found their living standards and take home pay decrease even as huge companies riding the ‘globalist wave’ made obscene profits by shipping operations overseas. America’s manufacturing base, once the envy of the world, began to shrink while China took advantage of its chimerical self-produced statistics, captive workforce and ravenous climate-change inducing abuse of its natural resources to convince US firms that they could do things faster, better and cheaper.

 

As Democratic support became more entrenched in the cities, and the Republicans expanded their control into the heartland, dominating the rural areas and suburbs outside the cities, Donald Trump saw the opportunity to harness these disenfranchised voters, who found in him the kind of leader who spoke in clear unvarnished language, vocalised their concerns and represented their anger at a rapacious, exploitative system. The cerebral, technocratic Hillary Clinton, already burdened by a lifetime of controversial political history, and who spoke more like a lawyer than a human being, had no chance of retaining such a constituency.

 

That’s why Tim Walz was selected: Harris has judged that he has appeal to these folks who tend to vote for someone more easily identifiable as “one of them”, the avuncular gun-carrying, former National Guard serviceman who’s taught high school and coached the state football team to the championships. He ‘balances’ her hipster lawyer Big City image.

 

And this was where Trump was wrongfooted. His entire campaign had been premised on a rematch between Joe Biden and himself. Given his momentum after the first debate, the near-death experience from the assassination attempt, and a consistent, solidifying lead in the polls, he felt confident enough to select Vance as his running mate. Trump elected to double down on his base and send a signal as to who the inheritor of the MAGA movement would be. After all, black and Hispanic voters were moving towards him in strong numbers, so he was probably correct in assuming that his base of blue-collar voters combined with a reasonable percentage of those respective communities would be enough for him to win. Emboldened, he chose J.D.Vance to be the new apostle of the amorphous MAGA movement, and doubled-down on the same kind of inflammatory rhetoric that kept him constantly in the headlines.

 

Yet the electoral college is not the only hurdle Harris has to face in order to pull ahead of Trump and stay there. 90 days (or less as of this article’s publishing) may seem like a long time, but a day can sometimes seem like an eternity in this hothouse political environment and, historically speaking, events tend to interfere with best laid plans. There are the upcoming debates, where Trump could pull it together and go after Harris on issues such as the border/illegal immigration and her progressive/liberal record, where she is vulnerable. At this stage lack of specificity on policy has not yet hurt her in the polls but sooner or later people will realize that “hope”, “change” and “protecting freedom” are not programs. It’s an opening a more disciplined candidate than Trump could exploit, but nonetheless the opportunity is there. Additionally, foreign policy developments could rear their ugly head: missteps in dealing with the Ukraine war and the volatile Middle East situation could easily turn the race on its head once again.

 

Add to this, a subsurface element that escapes the “science” of polling being advanced by many purveyors of the “craft.” This could be labelled, the “Trump Factor.” We saw this phenomenon manifest itself first in the 2016 Republican primaries when he seemingly came out of nowhere to win both those and the presidency. Joe Biden had built up what appeared to be a solid 5%-7% plus national popular vote lead by late October 2020, just to be shocked on election night when over 74 million people voted for Trump, much higher than anticipated. That’s because a segment of American voters simply do not share with pollsters their true preference. It is likely to happen again this fall.

 

Finally, there is one other influential factor which cuts through to the core of all voter concerns irrespective of party, race, colour, or creed: the economy, pocketbook issues and the cost of living crisis. By itself, the economy does not determine elections in America, but it is important. Its course will inevitably weigh heavily on the Democrats’ chances. An outright recession would doom Harris’ chances. But even if the economy is only cooling or starting to cool (as is likely) it could still harm her and aid Trump.

 

After growing at rates that were the envy of the G7, there are signs that the economy is indeed slowing. Investors, clearly worried that a recession is just around the corner, have sent global stock markets on a roller coaster ride. For example, on August 5th, three days after the news that the US unemployment rate had risen to 4.3% in July, its highest since 2021, stock markets dropped worldwide, before recovering some lost ground the next day.

 

So that brooks the question: is America really on the brink of recession? Some indicators don’t look good. The unemployment rate has risen significantly from its recent lows, a move that has often signalled recessions in the past. Given the state of the economy, interest rates are probably about one to two percentage points too high. Indeed, yields on long-term Treasuries have fallen below those on short-term bonds, in anticipation of a weakening economy and steep interest-rate cuts by the Federal Reserve.

 

Yet it seems America is in for a gradual slowdown, not a crash. High interest rates have gradually cooled the labour market since the unemployment rate reached its lowest in April 2023. That in turn has suppressed the growth in wages and adversely impacted shoppers’ confidence. There are contradictory signals: consumer-facing companies, such as McDonald’s, have reported disappointing sales. Yet others have done much better and gdp is still expanding. In the second quarter of the year, it grew at an annualised pace of 2.8%, which is above its long-term trend. Estimates of economic growth in the current quarter are above 2%, not great, but not bad either. Restaurant bookings, air travel and tax collections all suggest that growth continues.

 

Moreover, lower long-term interest rates are already giving the economy a prophylactic shot in the arm—and it has become more powerful as skittish investors have rushed into bonds this week. Surveys of banks show some easing in credit conditions. Jerome Powell and the Fed will need to cut its policy interest rate in September in order to fulfil investors’ expectations, but that should be a mere formality. Rates on mortgages and credit-card debt are falling in anticipation.

 

Yet a slowdown but not a recession still poses an issue for Harris. Even if voters deny Democrats any credit for the economic boom, they may nonetheless blame her if the economy loses steam. This is the flip side of the perception we mentioned earlier: if they feel things are getting worse, they are likely to blame someone.

 

Harris should be able to campaign on the Biden administration’s economic record. Workers’ median real earnings are 9.4% higher than when Americans went to the polls in 2016. Even among men without a high-school diploma, the unemployment rate is only 5.1%. Indeed, swing states such as Pennsylvania have enjoyed mostly lower inflation and unemployment than the national average. Given all that, the complaint of J.D. Vance, unabashedly protectionist, that America has sacrificed jobs to import “knockoff toasters” is at best, hyperbole.

 

So polarised is the US body politic these days, Republicans’ perceptions of the economy are warped by their politics—as are Democrats’ in the other direction — just like the extreme of MAGA vs Woke. But voters as a whole still give the Democrats’ economic management a worse rating than Trump’s for the elemental reason that every time they go shopping, they get sticker-shock. Even if inflation is falling, prices are nearly 20% higher than when Biden entered office. No amount of “Covid caused it” or “it’s the same all over the world” will overcome that simple, unavoidable reality. People react to the reality on their bills, not abstract concepts.

 

On their own, stock market wobbles are unlikely to make this worse. Nor is this “the Kamala crash”, as Trump has put it. The S&P 500 index of stocks was 8% below its peak, yet the stock market had been due for a correction for some time, because it was priced so dearly relative to firms’ earnings. The index is still up by 9% this year and American firms have on average beaten profit forecasts. The biggest slump has taken place not on Wall Street but in Japan.

 

The real threat to Democrats is the underlying slowdown that helped unnerve the markets. Research suggests that voters weigh recent economic events heavily, meaning that the performance of the economy in the run-up to the election matters most for the result. Growth in after-tax real incomes per person in just the two quarters before a poll, combined with the time a party has been in office, is closely correlated with American presidential election results. Just ask Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush.

 

Here the Democrats have something to worry about. At the start of the year, real incomes were rising at an annualised quarterly pace of about 1%. As the economy has cooled, this has fallen by roughly half. Consumer confidence was already unusually low, especially given strong growth and a jobs boom. With the slowdown, it is even lower today than in January and it may take another knock from stock market falls, or a surge in oil prices if war spreads in the Middle East.

 

None of this means that Trump is destined to win. Barack Obama returned to the White House in 2012 despite a poor economy, and Trump is vulnerable on other issues (not the least of which is his inability to focus and his tendency to hurl incendiary invectives which tend to obscure the merits of his argument). In a tight race, many factors could be the difference between victory and defeat, and it may be that what determines the result is not earth-shaking developments, but rather many small factors which culminate in a last-minute decision when a citizen is inside the voting booth.

 

This surge of enthusiasm for Harris has levelled the playing field. And Harris will seek to maximise her lead in subjects such as abortion and health care. But there are still miles to go, and Trump has shown a resilience which opponents discount at their peril. Moreover, politics in a close race more often than not comes down to a matter of luck. And he is a lucky man.

 


 

Note: What to look for in the Polls

 

A glut of surveys over the next few days following the Democratic Party convention will start to bombard television screens and fill the media ether. It will be followed by an hothouse two months of polling. There are several key measures to watch that have so far buoyed Harris’ nascent candidacy: metrics like her personal favorability, which has spiked, or Trump’s narrowing advantage on the economy, one of the former president’s core issues.

 

Here are five numbers to watch, beyond the horserace, to understand the real state of the race:

 

i) Kamala Harris’ favourable rating

 

Voters are seeing Harris in a new light since she became Democrats’ presidential candidate. Throughout the past three years, there has been a wide gulf between the number of voters who had a favorable opinion of the vice president, and the significantly larger share who viewed her unfavorably. this is not surprising, as the vice presidency can be a thankless job, with its occupant relegated to the role of second fiddle, cheerleader and 'spare.'

 

Ever since her ascension, that gap has closed. In recent polls, just as many likely voters across Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin viewed her favorably (50 percent) as unfavorably (48 percent).

 

That doesn’t mean it will last, though: Trump’s campaign has started an advertising barrage in battleground states, trying to paint her as “dangerously liberal.” If that doesn’t stick, then an attack on her border record, illegal migration and the economy could.

 

ii) Third Party Vote Share

 

In the weeks since Harris replaced Biden at the top of the Democratic ticket, the percentage of voters telling pollsters they plan to vote for one of the three independent or third-party candidates — Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Cornel West or Jill Stein — has been cut almost in half.

 

This is specifically revealing of an election in which more voters — thanks to Harris’ surge in popularity and Trump’s post-assassination and post-conviction uptick in favorability — actually like their main options. The lower these third party candidates get, the more likely Trump or Harris will benefit. The question is: who will get the bigger boost?

 

iii) Voter Enthusiasm

 

The more enthusiastic party doesn’t always win: In 2012, polls actually showed Mitt Romney’s supporters were more enthusiastic about voting than President Barack Obama’s.

 

But Harris has managed to energize Democrats with her candidacy in a way that Biden — and the specter of a second Trump term — hadn’t. As of this writing, Democrats and Harris supporters were just as likely as Republicans and Trump supporters to say they were “very enthusiastic” about voting.

 

iv) Who Would Better Handle the Economy?

 

Trump has long held a commanding lead over Biden on this issue . But that, too, has been upended by the switch at the top of the Democratic ticket.

 

Polls now show Trump with only a slim edge on the economy against Harris: her recent event in North Carolina touting her plan to lower costs was a sign that Biden’s inflation record could detrimental to her candidacy if she can’t seize the narrative and create her own identity by building on his foundations and taking a slightly more populist direction.

 

v) Right or Wrong Direction for the Country?

 

Somewhat ironically for a former president, Trump had come to represent change, especially while contrasted with Biden. And with two in three voters seeing the country as headed on the wrong track, that was an advantageous position for him.

 

But Harris’ entry has muddled Trump’s status as the change candidate. Now she’s the one laying a claim to the mantle of new and — yes — younger. It’s harder to be fresh and exciting when you’re 78 years old and the first person in 80 years to be your party’s presidential nominee in three consecutive elections.

 

As they will with the economy, Trump and his allies will be trying to convince voters who think the country is on the wrong track that Harris’ role as vice president makes her responsible for the current state of the country.


Watch this Space.

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